Bedrosian represents at MPSA 2015
Bedrosian Faculty and their research were widely represented at the 73rd annual Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) Conference this past week.
Kathleen Doherty presented two papers:
Private Sector Experts and Policymaking in the FDA
The paper examines whether incorporating private sector experts into drug approval decisions affects agency policy choices and quality.
Politics or Performance in Agency Personnel Turnover
With David E. Lewis (Vanderbilt University) and Scott Limbocker (Vanderbilt University) – We examine presidential efforts to control key regulatory positions held by career bureaucrats and find that turnover is driven by political marginalization and the pre-emptive choice of career bureaucrats to exit government.
LaVonna Blair Lewis presented a paper:
Mandatory Menu Labeling in California: Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework to Examine the Health Policymaking Process
With Denise Diaz Payan (University of Southern California) – Obesity-related state policies have not been studied using a theoretical policymaking perspective. This study uses the ACF to examine advocacy coalitions and their beliefs prior to the 2008 passage of a mandatory menu labeling policy in California.
Pamela McCann presented two papers:
Intergovernmental Delegations and Roll-Call Voting on Federal Grant Programs
(with Tony Bertelli, NYU) Federal grants to the states are a common device used by Congress to delegate the implementation of significant domestic policies to the states. How does the blending of implementation authority between state and federal actors influence member vote choices given their national and state political contexts? Employing a unique dataset that captures all grants-in-aid provisions included in all significant domestic House and Senate bills and public laws during the 93rd-111th congresses and the logic of transaction costs, we hypothesize and find support that as bills concentrate more authority in state actors, members are more likely to vote for final passage, but only when they do not share the party of the president.
Taking Turns: Specialization and Comparative Advantage in House-Senate Interactions
With Daniel Magleby (Binghamton University) – When does the Senate exert more influence over the content of the final law than does the House? We define a bill as a package of text that provides information about the allocation of resources and the policy solutions chosen to tackle these problems. We delineate a model of House and Senate negotiations over policy choices, discuss a novel measure of policy content using plagiarism software, and provide initial empirical tests of our hypotheses. We find the Senate filibuster exerts more influence when it is from the opposing party as the president and the House shares the president’s party, but the House exerts more influence when this is not the case.
William G. Resh presented a paper:
The Persistence of Public Service Motivation and Mission Match in the Face of Negative Feedback
In this study, we test whether individuals with more public service motivation and high mission match are more likely to persist in their work efforts with a constant of negative feedback to their performance.