The Power of Economic Interests Under Direct versus Representative Democracy The power of economic interest groups to influence policy outcomes is a common theme in economics and political science. Most theories posit that interest group power arises from the ability to influence elected or appointed government officials, that is, by exploiting the representative part of democracy.…
Beyond a Reliable Vote: Coordination and Information Problems in Congressional Nominations Research in collaboration with: Knox Brown, Angela Ocampo, Shawn Patterson, John Ray and John Zaller Congressional primaries, like primary elections in general, are imagined to give voters, rather than party elites, the ability to choose which candidate wins the nomination. Indeed, we might expect primary…
The Challenge of Measuring Political Polarization in the US over Time using Congressional Roll Call Votes Jeff Lewis is professor of Political Science, UCLA. He is also the current president of the Society for Political Methodology. His research and teaching are in the areas of quantitative methodology and American politics. *Political Institutions and Political Economy
Janna Rezaee, Assistant Professor, USC Sol Price School of Public Policy, received her Ph.D. at UC Berkeley. “Revolving Doors” co-authored by Ryan Hubert, UC Berkeley Janna Rezaee’s research focuses on the “revolving door” between government and the private sector as an institutional response to policy-development monopolies. The prevailing wisdom about the revolving door is that…
Legislative solutions to society’s pressing problems usually require compromise, but we find that around a quarter of state legislators and many elected city officials reject proposals that move policy in their preferred direction and make them better off. The legislators who reject compromise proposals tend to be those who perceive that their voters – especially their primary voters – are likely to punish them for compromising. This threat of punishment also affects the voting behavior of members of Congress.
Brian Newman discussed his research paper (co-authored with John Griffin of University of Colorado, Boulder). Newman studies the racial consequences of presidential incentives to move toward the median voter as elections approach.
Partisan polarization has steadily increased in recent years. Democrats and Republicans in Congress have become two ideologically divided groups, with little ability to work together to solve the nation’s problems. And, citizens have increasingly used partisanship to guide their voting decisions, even as they diverge more and more on answers to the important questions of the day.
As we moved into the second year of Trump’s administration, we explored what partisanship looks like in Congress and the nation.
The first goal of the PIPE program will be to hold a regular scholarly workshop, structured around external speakers, that will bring together USC faculty and graduate students from Price, Gould, Marshall, Dornsife (the Political Science and Economics Departments) who have an interest in political institutions and political economy. The workshop will provide a regular forum for PIPE scholarship and create an environment for new collaborations…
Foreign Real Estate Investment and Incumbent Party Support in the U.S. Few economic issues affect people as personally and universally as housing. Yet despite the increasing globalization of housing markets, little is known about its effect on political behavior. This study explores how Chinese investments in U.S. residential property shaped support for the incumbent party.…
Life, Literacy, and The Pursuit of Prosperity: Party Competition & Policy Outcomes in 50 States About the Talk: We examine whether strenuous party competition promotes economic development and improves social outcomes, drawing on evidence from the 50 American states over the last century. Our evidence includes data on party competition, state spending, and measures of health, education, and prosperity, drawn…