PIPE Symposium: The Political Economy of Executive Power

In recent years, as polarization has gripped legislatures in America and inhibited lawmaking, executive branch officials have stepped into the policymaking breach. For example, a number of Important policy decisions have been made by chief executives acting unilaterally and by agencies via new regulations.

The Political Economy of Executive Power Symposium explores these changes, both positively (how powerful are chief executives in fact becoming?) and normatively (how does a stronger executive branch affect the overall constitutional order?).

A set of national scholars — including Douglas Kriner (Cornell), William Howell (Chicago), Patricia Kirkland (Princeton), Rachel Augustine Potter (Virginia), Jon Rogowski (Princeton), and Sharece Thrower (Vanderbilt) — will present research on these related topics.

The symposium will close with William Howell discussing his soon-to-be-published manuscript, Reckoning: Presidents, Populism, and American Democracy, which was co-authored by Terry Moe (Stanford).