COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA:
CASES IN NEGOTIATED POLICYMAKING AND SERVICE DELIVERY

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INTRODUCTION

Collaborative governance has been defined as the process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and monitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address public policy problems that cannot be easily addressed by a single organization or the public sector alone (Ansell and Gash 2008). Although a worldwide phenomenon, the rise of collaborative governance in different countries can be attributed to different factors depending on specific historical and institutional contexts. These differences affect collaborative governing arrangements and their relative efficacy as tools for public problem solving. Yet in the emerging literature on collaborative governance, there have been few systematic efforts that compare collaborative governance across different nations. In this symposium, we take a step in this direction by examining experiences in two countries, the United States and Korea.

In this introductory essay, we first outline some major forces that have been driving the rise of collaborative governance in each of the two countries. Then we explore the theoretical and policy problems raised by this trend in each country. Next, we provide an overview of the contributions to this symposium.
THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA

In the past several decades, governments around the globe have been struggling to cope with a growing range of challenges. These challenges are emerging at the very moment when the public has been generally disinclined to support tax increases, especially for remote governments and for social policy purposes. The public is inclined to believe that governments are wasteful and fail to represent its interests, and generally has a low regard for the public sector and the legitimacy of government itself (Hetherington 2006). These phenomena, combined with global competition in the post–cold war era, are both cause and effect of the continuing budget squeeze in governments and the lessening of the public sector’s capacity to address growing challenges. Consequently, a large gap has remained between these challenges and wherewithal for adequate responses.

Governments, from the local up through the national level, in both the United States and Korea, have responded in many ways. In some instances services have been held to the level of funding and capacity available. Fiscal strategies have been employed to shield the true cost of services through such practices as deferring worker compensation, or through borrowing and bonding to cover current services. Sometimes public agencies have “reinvented” themselves to be more business-like, focusing on business sector principles of performance-based, client-centric management, and output and impact goals that are intended to produce savings and improved public satisfaction. In a number of instances, services have been contracted out to nonprofit and for-profit organizations to reduce costs, improve delivery, and/or establish market-based
benchmarks for their activity. And, in some cases, governments have tried one or more or a mix of all of the above.

Government service delivery processes and their underlying institutional structures are undergoing profound changes. While hierarchical public agencies large and small remain the dominant form of organization, the authority-based, hierarchical twentieth century public administration theory and practice is no longer the dominant paradigm and way of thinking. Yet its replacement is not necessarily the other ideal institutional form of delivery—market-based transactions, once conceptualized as the “big tradeoff” (Okun 1975). Realistically, a continuum extends from authority-based arrangements at one end to market-based arrangements at the other, with much room for hybrids in between. The most pressing question for understanding public sector management and service delivery in contemporary governments has become, if not the classic ideal of hierarchy versus market, which of the institutional forms along the continuum are best suited to what types of public purposes, and why (Hooghe and Marks 2003)? While institutional forms can be aligned along a fairly lengthy continuum, four major archetypical forms can be identified (see Table 1).
Table 1: Four Institutional Forms

| #1: Authority-based Arrangements: Government hierarchies (command and control regulations; government agencies) | #2: Authority-based Arrangements: Outsourcing (principal-agent relationships; long-term contracts) | #3: Collaborative Governance Arrangements (joint provision of services by public, for-profit, and nonprofit organizations; brought together either by mandates or as an emergent phenomenon) | #4: Market-based Arrangements (self interest, financial rewards, competition, winners and losers, private property rights) |

On one end of the continuum is the classic authority-based form (#1), characterized by command-and-control, with public agencies performing services and enforcing regulations, within the broader context of the three branches of government (i.e., classic Weberian hierarchical, executive branch organizations within the U.S. model of representative democracy). At the other end of the continuum is the market-based form (#4), of importance in the literature traditionally as the polar opposite of the classic public authority-based form (Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Poole, Mansfield and Gould-Williams 2006). Examples of its applications can be found today in such areas as emission fees and credit trading regimes to reduce air pollution (Tietenberg 2003), and some limited uses of vouchers in elementary education (Neal 2002; Steuerle et al. 2000). While interesting theoretically, the market-based form has not been widely embraced in application as either technically feasible or philosophically preferable in most public service delivery arenas.
A form that has risen in prominence in the United States in the past several decades, has grown in importance in Korea in the past decade, and has received the most attention by advocates pro and con is form #2 in Figure 1—government that is authority-based but utilizes outsourcing as the delivery mechanism for public goods and services. Proponents underscore the theoretically important difference between the provision of public goods and services—the enactment of policies by government—and their production—their implementation (Ostrom and Ostrom 1991; Savas 1987). They argue that while governments should raise funds for and decide on the quantity and quality of public services and goods, the actual production (delivery) of the services and goods can be carried out by any number of public, nonprofit, or private sector vendors competing in the marketplace. Proponents contend that this division of labor captures greater economies of scale and efficiencies than are usually obtainable within government (Donahue and Nye 2002).

As a practical matter, outsourcing has become a major feature of American government (Minicucci and Donahue 2004) and of growing importance in Korea as well (Jung 2007). It has also come to play a central role in the initiation and operation of e-government services throughout the United States (Ni and Bretschneider 2007). Clearly this is an important change in how services are being delivered, raising important issues of oversight (Marvel and Marvel 2007), accountability (Hodge and Coghill 2007), principal-agent relations (Knott 1993), and the public’s perception of service delivery and overall satisfaction with government.

Outsourcing itself has changed over the past decades, as it has moved from the simple model of one government entity contracting with one outside vendor, to more
complex models in which multiple government entities contract with networks of vendors who are connected to each other through multiple subcontracts. A prominent example is the mental health service delivery network in the state of Arizona studied by Milward and Provan (2000). One of their central observations is that among the network of vendors producing mental health services on behalf of the state of Arizona, principal-agent relationships exist in terms of a network administrative organization (a nonprofit organization itself) being empowered by its state funders to award subcontracts to other nonprofit vendors and to oversee their performance. At the conceptual level this type of subcontracting can be thought of as an important, albeit, second-order effect, with the primary effect being the government, as principal, contracting with private vendors. The point is that several variations of institutional arrangements have evolved within the broad umbrella of outsourcing, and have continued to promote discussion and research in the field of public management (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2006).

An even more intriguing, theoretically important and challenging set of questions is being raised by the emergence of collaborations that bridge the classic divides of the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Labeled #3 in Table 1, collaborative governance may span one, several, or even all the stages of the public policy process—from formulation, enactment, implementation to evaluation and feedback. In this sense, the process goes beyond the principal-agent relations of sub-contracting. Collaborative governance also draws on the unique attributes and resources of participating sectors, with each expected to add significant value to the joint enterprise. In broad terms, governments bring to the enterprise the authority and coercive powers of the state and taxation powers. Private sector actors bring funding secured through private capital
markets, real property, financial management skills, entrepreneurial spirit, agility and timeliness, business-like management practices, and organizational and individual incentives. Nonprofit and nongovernment organizations provide voice for the real or perceived under-represented sectors of society and provide them a seat at the policy planning or negotiating table. This is so particularly when the view of the minority conflicts with the aspirations and projects of the government in satisfying the needs of the overall community, thereby reflecting the preferences of the majority. Also important is the willingness of nongovernmental organizations to perform as intermediaries in the provision of public goods and services, using their moral suasion and social capital, on the one hand, and business-like management skills on the other in delivering services (Smith and Gronbjerg 2006).

Although these collaborative arrangements seldom require a formal and explicit relinquishing of government authority, they do entail to some extent power sharing, which flows from joint decision making, resource sharing, and joint responsibility to see that all participants in the process are satisfied in the outcome (Bogason and Musso 2005; Cooper, Bryer and Meek 2006; Fung 2006). Within this context, there is also a wide array of possible collaborative governance arrangements that embrace more versus less authority sharing. These arrangements extend from those bound together by norms and trust among the collaborating entities to those bound by higher order government expectations or more formal requirements.

The rise of collaborative governance is evident in many different arenas. In the United States it has become standard practice for sponsors to work with networks of governmental, philanthropic, educational, and other funders to design, produce and
manage low-income housing in poor inner cities (Langley et al. 1996). In public health, public and private stakeholders—health and social service providers, foundations, civic organizations, and citizens groups—are regularly involved in partnerships or coalitions for planning, managing, and evaluating community health initiatives (Weiner, Alexander and Zuckerman 2000). In education, cross-sectoral collaboration has played a significant role in the development and support of charter schools (Wohlstetter 2004). Collaborative governance has also come to dominate major water resource planning across the U.S. (Innes and Boher 2003; see also Blomquist, Schlager and Heikkila 2004). Similarly, collaborative governance has become the dominant form for resource management planning and implementation of the many resource conservation and endangered species projects of the Federal Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management, especially those that encompass both public and private lands (Porter and Salvesen 1995; Sabatier et al. 2005; Thomas 2003). And, as state and local governments have found themselves unable to fund their vital transportation and infrastructure needs through public dollars alone, and/or to break through the gridlock of private and public opposition to roads and freeway expansion, they are being drawn to novel forms of collaborative governance for project planning, financing, and construction (Callahan 2007; U.S. DOT 2007).

Collaborative governance has been on the rise not just in the U.S., but also in many other parts of the world (Freeman and Peck 2007 Lee and Haque 2006; Noble and Jones 2006). Internationally, most economic development projects supported by international organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations call for private sector business interests to partner with host governments, NGOs, and community groups
in designing and implementing solutions to local public problems (Western, Wright and Strum 1994).

In Korea, collaborative governance has also been on the rise, but in a different historical and institutional context. Korea has existed as a nation state for nearly 3,000 years—since 700 BCE. Yet it was only in 1948 that a republican form of government was established in Korea. In the years since the end of the Korean War (1950–1953), Korea has successfully developed a modern nation state. It achieved rapid industrialization in the four decades after the war, and has consolidated its democratic institutions since the late 1980s. Korea is currently the world’s thirteenth largest economy in terms of GDP and enjoys the highest level of liberal democracy in Asia (Thompson 1996; Freedomhouse.org each year). Yet the country currently faces a variety of public policy problems, a result partly of the rapid industrialization and “condensed” growth of the past few decades.

Economic development policies in those decades were based on a “selection and concentration” strategy, which has created many social imbalances and under-developed sectors in society. As a result, Korea is faced with many public policy problems, including the need to redevelop poorly planned urban areas by applying sound urban design principles, restore damaged and polluted natural environments, improve the quality of life for low-wage workers, and more.

In addition, there are many newly emerging public policy problems. One urgent issue is to build social safety nets for people failing to adapt to neo-liberalist values and market-oriented competition in an age of globalization (Jung 2006). Korea also needs to address the problem of population aging, which is taking place at one of the fastest paces
in the world. In order to resolve and prepare for the rapidly progressing phenomenon of low fertility, Korea needs to reduce education costs for children while enhancing the effectiveness of public education, and at the same time building childcare facilities to help working mothers.

All these are tasks that need to be resolved through public policies. In the two decades since the 1987 democratic transition, the Korean government has steadily expanded. This is partly the result of people expressing their demand for public services in the now-democratic society, which they could not do during former periods of authoritarianism. Politicians easily acquiesced to these public demands, hoping to win votes in the election processes that had become much more competitive than in the past.

In the December 2008 presidential election, however, Korean voters departed from their previous support of government growth, and elected by a landslide a candidate with a “small government” platform. Their choice can be interpreted as a new public sentiment that the government should promote economic growth through tax reductions, deregulation, and market competition principles.

Although Korean voters opted for “small-government,” it is unclear whether they would actually support a cutback of the public services they have been enjoying for the past twenty years. While preferring fewer tax burdens and government deregulations, the Korean people were also making demands that conflicted with these preferences—asking the government to maintain the expanded public services and furthermore to address effectively various newly emerging public problems. To resolve this political dilemma, Korea needs to enhance its governing capacity such that it can keep government small
while at the same time provide a wide array of public services and address the newly emerging public policy problems of this age and time.

The institutionalization of a new governance system is needed also to meet the demand for democratic participation. Korea has witnessed a dramatic growth in citizen participation in public policy making since the 1987 democratic transition. However, given the rapid pace of democratization in the past two decades, an effective governing system that matches the need for expanded citizen participation and civic engagement has yet to take root. This has created numerous conflicts between social groups (e.g., between doctors and pharmacists over the enactment of the Separation of Drug Dispensing and Prescription Act), between the government and individuals/social groups (e.g., between the government and local residents over the selection of a U.S. Army relocation site), between government agencies (e.g., between ministries over the selection of a ministry to supervise information and telecommunications policies), between the central and local (or local and local) governments (e.g., over the selection of a radioactive waste disposal facility site), and so on. These conflicts lead to delays in public policy making or to sudden suspensions of policy implementation, damaging Korea’s national competitiveness in the process. It is therefore necessary to leave behind this stage of conflicts and disputes, and to institutionalize a new collaborative approach where government, civil society, and the market address public policy problems through mutual adjustments and collaboration.

Challenges for Research
In the context of the United States, because of its blended character, collaborative governance requires addressing anew the classic questions of representative governance, with its delegation of powers to public agencies to carry out the public purpose, and its questions of how to understand and track policy implementation, the role of public, nonprofit, and for-profit actors, and the sharing of power and responsibility. For example, when authority is shared among entities from multiple sectors, how is accountability to the electorate to be upheld? How are conflicts and collective-action problems among participating entities to be resolved? How is collaborative governance to be evaluated, both substantively and procedurally? What are the appropriate sanctions and rewards for the various actors? Is the emergence of collaborative governance simply a consequence of the shift toward a private sector–oriented ideology among elected officials and the public? While collaborative governance may be a more flexible organizational form, is it as reliable as other traditional forms of public problem solving? When private interests are directly involved in the governance processes, how are the classic public management concerns of agency capture, public sector personnel corruption, and public transparency to be addressed?

In Korea, it remains a question as to whether collaborative governance can be institutionalized in a society in which the traditional mode of governing, an Asiatic administrative state, had for centuries been premised on centralized and hierarchical authorities (Jung 2005; Thompson 1996). Another obstacle for the institutionalization of collaborative governance in Korea is that despite the rapid growth of civil society in the two decades since the nation’s democratic transition (see Figure 1), there remains a
serious lack of trust among organizations from different sectors—the state, the market, and civil society.

Figure 1: Growth of Civic Groups in Korea, 1940s–1990s


With regard to the evolution and institutionalization of collaborative governance, the United States and Korea provide interesting contrasts. In the United States, while the contemporary form of collaborative governance is a newly emergent phenomenon, the country itself has had a long tradition of drawing on civil society and the private sector in search of solutions to public problems. In contrast, the history of Korea is filled with experiences of state-centered approaches to public problem solving, including hundreds of years of hierarchical governance based on Confucian values, Japanese imperialist colonial rule (1910–1945), and four decades of authoritarian administrations since the
founding of the Republic. This explains why distrust still runs deep in the relations between government, market, and civil society. Accustomed to a state-centered approach to public problem solving, the Korean people may now prefer “small government” but may still expect the central government to undertake decisive and sometimes heavy-handed approaches to public problem solving. All these factors raise doubts about the feasibility of building effective collaborative governance arrangements in Korea.

Contributions in this Symposium

The papers in this symposium approach the issue of collaborative governance along two distinct but complementary analytical dimensions. The first considers the important stages of the public policy process in a democratic society—from the way issues are culturally framed and understood within a society, to the process of policy formulation and planning for specific projects, through to the actual delivery of public goods and services—when in one or more of the steps along the way, these processes take place through a collaborative mechanism. The second dimension is that of efficacy, that is, the extent to which the collaborative approach can be judged as successful in the context—at the stage—in which it is utilized. Always important but far less easy to gauge is the extent to which the collaboration had a notable or substantial effect on the project or activity that was the end goal.

The contexts in which collaborative approaches are being used today are many and growing. This is illustrated by the eight cases that follow. They also underscore the fact that although the techniques of collaboration and conflict resolution are becoming
well known, the result of a collaboration and the link to policy and program goals can only be understood within the specifics of the particular case. This leads us to the conclusion that while collaborative approaches are being employed widely as an alternative to top-down and unilateral government action and as good (“best”) practices, the outcome of these processes remains mixed. In essence, we have come to understand collaborative processes as better than the conventional, yet recognize that they provide us with necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful resolution of political and policy controversies and conflicts. At least this is the conclusion drawn from the cases examined herein.

The first paper in the symposium, by Michael Moody, “Everyone Will Get Better Together: How Those Responsible for California’s Bay-Delta Water System Understand Collaboration,” takes as its starting point the importance of the different understandings that the participants bring to a collaboration. These different understandings are based on experience, perceptions, and interests, and are exacerbated when a wide range of participants are drawn together because of the scale, complexity, and potential impacts of a public policy dispute. In this case, it was over the long-term management of the California Bay-Delta, which is central to the economic and urban growth and ecological well being of the entire state. The study illuminates the importance of understanding such differences, and shows that acknowledging and accommodating them at the very early stage of the policy process is necessary if the collaboration is to have a chance at being successful. The analysis focuses on how the participants came to understand the core elements, definitions, and difficulties of collaboration, as well as how they came to justify collaborative activities and how they perceived the benefits, that is, how understandings
developed through mutual practice of collaboration and, in turn, how these understandings had positive practical consequences. Data for the analysis were gathered from multi-year and multi-method research on the participants in the Bay-Delta policymaking and governance process.

Jin Sik Choi adds to our understanding of the importance of the stakeholder perception in his paper “The Roles of Affect and Cultural Heuristics in Collaborative Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Crematory Facility Siting in Korea.” In this instance, the factor examined is non-government actors’ perceptions of the intent of government actors. Choi posits that “if the actors in the non-government sector perceive that collaborative governance may be against their interests, they will dispute, rather than collaborate, with the government.” This is a paradox of course, since “it is in the very cases where public interests are incompatible with private interests that the government should collaborate with actors in the private sector.” Based on a cultural heuristics model of risk perception and empirical data of the perceptions around a proposed siting of a crematory, Choi peels back the layers of factors affecting perceptions of “others,” as they relate to perceptions of risk, through exploring an array of values, attitudes, and partisan views. He explores the possibility that negative perceptions by the community can be offset by offers of community development and various forms of compensation.

Lisa Schweitzer examines the issue of justice—actually the “injustice”—that often accompanies the siting of unwanted land uses, in “Environmental Justice and Collaborative Governance: Building A Socio-Spatial Perspective for Management.” The paper examines “the challenges to cross-sectoral, collaborative governance of urban environments as viewed through the lens of environmental justice activism to explore
another double-edged aspect of collaboration: legitimacy and justice.” Schweitzer draws on the extensive environmental justice literature and experiences in the United States over the past several decades, which find a concentration of environmental hazards, including polluting and nuisance industries (such as recycling) among communities inhabited by racial minorities and the less-well-off groups in the United States. The paper reviews both the experiences and approaches to off-setting if not remedying the imbalance in power, when the less-well-off and especially racial minorities have attempted to oppose unwanted facilities.

Schweitzer concludes that “the overwhelming lesson from the research and activism on environmental justice is that neighborhoods are not equal. Their histories, their engagement with local governments and institutions, their goals, and their capacity for political self-determination differ significantly because of the geographically uneven distribution of poverty and opportunity.” This stands as a caution to those who believe there is a simple or equitably drawn collaborative answer to inherent inequities and racial differences, at least in American society, notwithstanding the success of collaborative forms in providing some neighborhoods targeted for a LULU with an effective means of opposition.

The paper by Elizabeth Graddy, “Cross-Sectoral Governance and Performance in Service Delivery,” moves into the implementation stage of the public policy process, assessing the value of collaboration in the actual delivery of social services. It explores the influence on service delivery effectiveness of the structure and management of inter-organizational governance functions, the nature of interdependencies in service delivery, the intensity of interactions, the characteristics of the constituent partners, and the
characteristics of the network within which the partnerships operate. The study compares twenty-six different networks providing child and family services throughout the county of Los Angeles, which is one of the largest social service areas in the entire United States. After testing a number of propositions from the literature about what should lead to effective collaborative service—such as the perceived trustworthiness of partners, the openness of decision making, information and resource sharing—Graddy concludes that the best predictor of success is the presence of a formal contract that defines “the roles and responsibilities” of the different entities involved. She concludes, among other things, that “results provide support for the pervasive use of formal written contracts in defining the nature of inter-organizational arrangements to deliver publicly-funded services.” While this may be an particularly American phenomenon, it is a reminder that explicit methods of accountability and performance are needed in a collaborative arrangement as much as, if not more than, in a hierarchical arrangement.

Anyone familiar with delivery of welfare services in contemporary societies can appreciate the challenge of addressing ever increasing public expectations for service and the growing difficulty of coordinating and delivering those services. Hyun Joo Chang’s paper, “Collaborative Governance in Welfare Service Delivery: Focusing on Local Welfare System in Korea,” highlights this point well. To meet this growing need, traditional welfare service delivery in Korea has been moving from traditional hierarchical public agencies to new forms of networking and collaborative service provision, that is, as in the Graddy study, collaboration in the implementation stage. “Since late 1990s, along with a trend of decentralization, there has been an increasing effort to put greater emphasis on building a local welfare system or community-based …
services to meet the needs of the elderly, the disabled, women, children, and youth.” This has resulted in the emergence of Community Welfare Councils that are intended to bring together the range of government, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations in a community to provide services in a more efficient and coordinated manner. This study provides a detailed assessment of the extent of collaboration in the planning and delivery of different welfare services through the council process, identifying areas where it works reasonably well, but also where it does not, which is often due to the inherent tension and built-in conflicts of mission among the different members of the collaboration.

Hyun Jun Park and Min Jeong Park, in their paper “Types of Network Governance and Network Performance: Community Development Project Case,” extend the analysis of collaborative approaches from the delivery of specific services to a broad focus on efforts by local communities to devise and carry out programs of development. While once the providence of government planning agencies, community development in Korea today (and in the United States) has become the responsibility of local actors, who of necessity must join together in cultivating the growth and development of their communities. The result is a growing number of collaborations and alliances formed by local governments that include private and non-profit organizations, plus state and national government agencies. The question Park and Park set out to answer is which types of community development collaborations are preferred and why. Their study draws on the experiences of a set of thirty local governments in building networks and garnering support for them through Korea’s HAPPY KOREA project, which “aims to develop characteristic and elegant living conditions that the present and subsequent generations can possess under cooperation between communities, residents and
administration by utilizing natural resources in their communities.” And while the development efforts are relatively young, the assessment has found that more important than any particular organizational and structural features of the collaboration is trust—the most successful ones are building on the trust that has been cultivated among the members. In the end, the ties among the players more than the form of the organization may be the overriding feature of effective collaboration among networked organizations. This appears to be the essence of collaborative governance in Korea, the United States, and most likely everywhere else it is emerging.

CONCLUSION

Collaborative governance has been emerging as a key institutional approach to public problem solving worldwide, including in the United States and Korea. Its potential role spans the entire spectrum of the policy making process—from planning and design to implementation and evaluation. The papers included in this symposium examine the role of collaborative governance at both ends of the policy process, i.e., negotiated policy making and service delivery. As discussed earlier in this essay, collaborative governance in the United States and Korea has emerged from different historical and institutional settings. Yet contributions in this symposium show how a number of common factors may account for the dynamics and performance of collaborative governing arrangements in the two countries.

First, collaborative governance involves actors from multiple organizations and sectors; as illustrated in the studies on California’s Bay-Delta Water System and the
crematory and waste facility siting cases in Korea, these actors tend to differ in their understandings and perceptions about the nature of the public problem they are involved in. These cases, for example, demonstrate how actors may differ in their perceptions about potential benefits and risks, and how various participatory and deliberative processes may shape and reshape their perceptions, and thus their willingness to join force with each other in tackling common problems.

Second, collaborative governance is inevitably connected to broader distributional issues in society, as illustrated by the discussions on environmental justice (or injustice) in the United States and the siting of locally undesirable facilities in Korea. These distributional issues tend to be conflict-ridden, and collaborative governance is seen by many as a tool for addressing distributional conflicts. Yet one must be cautious in not employing collaborative governance as a panacea because, as is illustrated in the cases, collaborative governance has both potential and limitations as a tool for conflict resolution.

Third, the cases show that collaborative governance tends to work better in the policy planning and negotiation stage when it seeks to involve a broad range of stakeholders in a less structured manner; at the implementation and service delivery stage, collaborative governance tends to work better with a more formalized structure, as illustrated in the cases on social/welfare service delivery in Los Angeles and Korea. Yet, as illustrated in the study on community development in Korea, local alliances and coalitions for development can benefit from the cultivation of trust among participants.

Finally, while the cases in this symposium highlight a number of common factors affecting the dynamics and success of collaborative governance in the United States and
Korea, one might speculate that these factors would play out differently in the two countries due to the differences in their historical and cultural contexts. Although the current cases do not address these issues directly, they provide useful starting points for the design of studies that explicitly compare and contrast the collaborative processes in the two societies. These all suggest important avenues of future research that could help clarify the applicability of different governing approaches, such as collaboration, in different cultural and societal contexts.

REFERENCES


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