

# Representation and Imposed Democratization: Evidence from Black Enfranchisement during Reconstruction\*

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## Abstract

The failure of Reconstruction is widely seen as a key factor in the social and economic status of African Americans today. Despite the imposed extension of the franchise to the formerly enslaved, Southern elites used violence and other extralegal means to regain power and ultimately remove these newly granted rights. In this paper, we study the importance of enforcement of political rights on the ability of the formerly enslaved to achieve political power during Reconstruction. We use data on the location of federal troops to predict the election of black politicians in the Congressionally-mandated state constitutional conventions and subsequent state legislatures. We use various estimation strategies, including exploiting railway coverage at the time of occupation, two-way fixed effects models, and an instrumental variable model, to analyze patterns of black representation state legislative bodies. We find that enforcement principally impacted representation through minority turnout. In light of the recent Supreme Court decisions to weaken the enforcement mechanisms of the Voting Rights Act and subsequent legislative efforts to suppress minority turnout, our evidence has implications on minority representation to this today.

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# 1 Introduction

The failure of Reconstruction, which was followed by nearly 75 years of segregation and very limited rights for the formerly enslaved and their ancestors, is seen as one of the reasons why American slavery continues to cast such a long shadow.<sup>1</sup> While the understanding factors explaining this failure have long been a focus of historians, this has increasingly become an important area of inquiry among social scientists (Chacon and Jensen, 2020; Heersink and Jenkins, 2020; Logan, 2020, 2019; Mazumder, 2019; Rogowski, 2018; Suryanarayan and White, 2021; Stewart and Kitchens, 2021). In this paper, we focus on one potential factor: namely, the role that the federal government played in the enforcement of political rights during Reconstruction. Specifically, we demonstrate how the presence of the US Army was crucial for the ability of the formerly enslaved to mobilize and obtain political representation. This empowerment quickly faded after the federal troops were removed, even before the introduction of formal restrictions (e.g., poll taxes and literacy tests) that effectively disenfranchised almost all Southern blacks until the 1960s.

The potential importance of federal enforcement during Reconstruction stems from several aspects of this context. For one, a large literature has shown that new democracies suffer from group-based economic inequalities. Despite the leveling of *de jure* political rights, these economic inequalities can translate into large *de facto* political inequalities (e.g., little influence on policy, lack of descriptive representation). Post-slavery societies, in particular, suffer from extreme group-based inequalities (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002; Alston and Ferrie, 2007; Acemoglu, García-Jimeno and Robinson, 2012). A particular threat to the empowerment of newly enfranchised groups in weakly institutionalized democracies arises from the exercise of political violence. Namely, the granting of political rights may not change

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Foner (2014), Bateman, Katznelson and Lapinski (2018), Valelly (2009), and Ransom and Sutch (2001). The long-run negative relationship between slavery and contemporary outcomes is well established (Craemer et al., 2020). See Nunn (2008) for evidence showing that highly enslaved counties in the US are poorer today, and Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2016) for evidence that highly enslaved counties are more likely to exhibit higher racist attitudes today.

the patterns of representation significantly if the old regime elites—facing threats to their power—respond with violence and coercion (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Indeed, transitions to democracy are frequently accompanied by selective violence and repression.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the representation of new groups could be minimal if they face violence and do not receive effective protection during a transition.

Second, unlike other slave societies in the Western Hemisphere, Southern slavery was abruptly ended by the Northern states during the American Civil War. Not only was an enormous source of Southern white wealth destroyed with emancipation, Congressional Republicans required black adult male suffrage as a condition for the readmission of rebel states to the Union. This meant that the recently emancipated would immediately enjoy *de jure* political equality with their former enslavers. Given the threat this transformation posed to Southern white economic interests, Congressional Republicans maintained an occupation force to guarantee these newly granted rights (including registering African Americans and enforcing their right to vote). Like most former post-slavery societies, there were enormous disparities in the distribution of *de facto* power. Almost all Southern economic resources, including the primary asset of land, were in the hands of whites, and in particular the former slaveowners. Thus, despite comprising a minority of the registered voters in most of the then Reconstruction states, Southern whites could—and ultimately did—use their *de facto* power to eventually minimize the political clout of the former slaves.<sup>3</sup>

In this paper, we study the extent to which federal enforcement, and specifically security provided by federal troops, promoted greater political representation among the recently emancipated between 1868 and 1878. Given the hostility of many Southern whites to Reconstruction, Congress tasked the US Army with protecting black political rights. Yet Congress never supported an occupation that was sufficient in size to protect the entire black electorate, which was thinly distributed across the vast rural South (Downs 2015). Thus, a large

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<sup>2</sup>According to Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005), approximately half of all democratic transitions between 1973 and 2000 were violent.

<sup>3</sup>The data on black registered voter share in 1868 was located in Walton, Puckett and Deskins (2012). Black voters were a majority in five states, and were more than 45% of the registered voters in three more.

proportion of the newly enfranchised voters resided in counties that were not protected. In addition, due to fiscal pressures and federal politics, the occupation steadily declined during the period ending abruptly in the late 1870s.<sup>4</sup> White Southerners responded to black suffrage with violence aimed at curtailing the ability of black communities to exercise their new rights (see e.g., Chalmers 1987; Foner 2014). Thousands of African Americans were murdered by terrorist organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan, formed to repress black leaders and their supporters.

We exploit this spatial variation of troop locations, as well as the changing dynamics of the occupation, to identify the impact of the Army on the electoral success of black candidates. Specifically, we combine a newly digitized dataset on the race of state legislators and the location of military outposts between 1868 and 1878. Our analysis also includes the delegations to the ten Reconstruction Conventions of 1867-68, which are the first elected bodies in Southern history to include black representatives.<sup>5</sup> Using this spatial and temporal variation, we find a positive and highly significant correlation between the federal occupation and African American representation during Reconstruction.

The location of troops is endogenous to many factors which could directly influence the mobilization of black voters and candidates. To address this we use the pre-war railway network to construct an estimating sample which potentially balances these factors. Namely, using the proximity of troops to the railways we create a set of “zones of army influence,” which are defined by areas in close proximity to an “army line” (railway lines within 5km of an army site). Thus, counties in close proximity to a zone of influence are compared with counties having the same proximity to a non-army railway line.<sup>6</sup> In both our complete

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<sup>4</sup>The occupation entailed provisioning a force with bases scattered across the South. This created a fiscal strain on the federal government, which already suffered from extremely high war-related debt financing.

<sup>5</sup>As we describe below, the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 mandated that each Reconstruction state hold a state convention, in which adult black males could participate, and for which black suffrage would be enshrined (Foner, 2014).

<sup>6</sup>The identifying assumption is that conditioning on having a railway line, the location of troops is independent of all the factors which could influence black representation. While this is strong assumption we cannot fully test, we are able to significantly improve the balance between occupied and non-occupied counties in key observable factors.

and restricted samples, we find that the presence of troops is positively and significantly associated with the incidence of black representatives. For instance, a zone of Army influence in 1867 is associated with approximately 0.5 more black delegates in the state conventions of 1867-68.

To further investigate the channels through which the protection of the Army fostered representation, we empirically explore the interaction effect between the occupation and a set of factors that are often associated with electoral mobilization. For instance, as per theories of social capital (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994), counties with more dense networks among black constituencies might have been better able to overcome their collective action dilemma. We find that occupied counties with a history of denser slave networks elected significantly more black representatives compared to similar non-occupied counties. Furthermore, we find that occupied counties having a higher number of pre-War free African Americans, a characteristic associated with human capital and which presumably positively impacted the supply of black leaders (Logan, 2020), were also comparatively more likely to elect black representatives. Using the of delegates in the Reconstruction conventions of 1867-68, we also find that troop deployments temporarily extended the gains in black representation achieved in the these initial years of enfranchisement. That is, these results demonstrate that enforcement amplified the effect of other factors often tied to greater minority representation.

In sum, our findings show that enforcement was important for effective political participation of the formerly enslaved during Reconstruction. Its failure had an immediate and negative consequence on black interests, one which is still reflected in the unequal contemporary economic status of African Americans. The evidence that effective democratic participation may require state interventions to limit the importance of disparities in de facto power, especially in a context of deep economic inequalities, also has important implications for contemporary American politics. The federal legislation and amendments in the 1960s that granted African Americans the right to vote, and in particular the Voting

Rights Act (1965), included key provisions for their enforcement. This statute’s efficacy of not only the extension of suffrage, but also its enforcement, has been demonstrated in terms of black voter registration (Keele, Cubbison and White, 2021), turnout (Husted and Kenny, 1997), representation of black interests in Congress (Schuit and Rogowski, 2017), and the distribution of state-level public resources (Cascio and Washington, 2013). Yet the decision of the Supreme Court in *Shelby vs. Holder* (2013) to strike-down the provision in the VRA requiring Southern states to seek “pre-clearance” for any changes to voting laws has been followed by a slew of laws aimed at restricting black (and other minority) voters. In particular, the sheer number of proposals to limit voting in Republican-dominated Southern legislatures following the 2020 Presidential election is widely seen as an attempt to restrict minority voting.<sup>7</sup>

## 2 Historical Context

On the eve of the American Civil War, which was precipitated by Southern secession and the subsequent formation of the Confederacy, approximately 4 million people in the seceding states were enslaved. With the North’s victory, and the successful adoption of the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment, the Republican Party sought to transform the political system of the South (Foner 2014). Despite intense resistance by many Southern whites and Northern Democrats, Congressional Republicans, buoyed by their veto-proof majorities, passed a series of bills in 1867 and 1868 known collectively as the Military Reconstruction Acts. Ten of the eleven Confederate states were placed into military districts with the goal of “reconstructing” their political systems prior to regaining Congressional representation.<sup>8</sup> In addition to requiring each state to create new state constitutions granting universal manhood suffrage and ratifying the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment, these acts provided a mandate for the Army to register eligible black

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<sup>7</sup>Fausset, Richard, Nick Corasaniti and Mark Leibovich “Why the Georgia G.O.P.’s Voting Rollbacks Will Hit Black People Hard,” *New York Times*, March 25, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/us/politics/georgia-black-voters.html>

<sup>8</sup>Tennessee was exempted because it had already been re-admitted to the Union in 1866 due in part to the influence of President Andrew Johnson, who was a native of the state.

males to vote and protect their ability to exercise the franchise.

These reforms led, however briefly, to a radical transformation of the party system in the South. For instance, following the Reconstruction conventions of 1868 (and 1869), the Republican Party, which was non-existent in the prewar South, won nine gubernatorial elections and majorities in 17 legislative chambers (Dubin 2007, 2010). The effectiveness at transforming Southern politics is demonstrated not only by the success of the Republican Party (the vast majority of whose voters were African American), but also by the election of thousands of black politicians and officials to local, state, and federal office throughout the South (Foner 1993). This political revolution also saw an expanding role of the state in providing redistributive public goods, in particular, in public education.<sup>9</sup>

When Southern whites intensified the use of violence to prevent Republican candidates and black voters from participating, Congress responded by passing three “Enforcement Acts” in 1870 and 1871. These laws empowered the federal government to regulate state and local elections, enforce political and civil rights, and prosecute those that interfered with political participation. Between 1871 and 1874, the federal government successfully prosecuted more than 1000 violations, and non-state groups such as the Ku Klux Klan were severely constrained (Walton, Puckett and Deskins 2012). Yet, the national government’s ability to protect African Americans in the South waned quickly after the Congressional elections of 1874, which gave Democrats a majority in the House. This allowed Democrats to prevent further military appropriations for Reconstruction.<sup>10</sup> The efforts to protect black voters ended with the Compromise of 1877, which allowed Republicans to retain the presidency in exchange for, among other promises, a commitment to remove troops from the the South (Foner 2014).

While African Americans retained their de jure voting rights and in practice remained politically active, the removal of federal troops sharply affected their electoral power. White

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<sup>9</sup>According to Foner (2014), “Republicans had established, for the first time in Southern history, the principle of state responsibility for public education.”

<sup>10</sup>In addition, the Supreme Court through a series of sentences in the mid-1870s severely curtailed the ability of the federal government to prosecute violations of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment (Foner 2014).

militias increased their violence and as result the number of black politicians elected fell significantly below the rates observed at the end of the 1860s and early 1870s.<sup>11</sup> Although Southern Democrats used targeted violence and electoral fraud to regain political power (Tolnay and Beck 1995), opposition groups still contested and occasionally overturned Democratic rule in some states. Only following the Era of Disenfranchisement (1888-1908) were Southern elites able to establish a “One-Party South”, in which the Democratic Party won nearly every Congressional and state-legislative seat in the region (Kousser 1974).

## 2.1 Southern Republican Party

While the Republican Party became dominant in the North soon after it was formed in the mid-1850s, it was essentially nonexistent in the prewar South. The choice of Congressional Republicans to pursue an expansion in the South was tied to their decision to grant civil rights to the former slaves. Prior to the Civil War, each slave counted as three-fifths of a person towards the state’s Congressional representation (and therefore also in the Electoral College). Since the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment reformed this such that each person counted equally, the defeated South stood to *gain* representation in the House and electoral votes in the electoral college. By enfranchising the former slaves, Congressional Republicans hoped that they could comprise the backbone of a competitive Southern Republican party that did not cede total control of the region to the Democrats.<sup>12</sup>

Republican leaders believed that in order to attract enough white voters to ensure sufficient support, the party’s most prominent elected officials should be white.<sup>13</sup> Yet, despite the constraints placed on top positions, black Republicans were elected in substantial numbers to all other state and local-level offices. While we know that thousands of African

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<sup>11</sup>In particular, the spike in political violence occurred in the various local, state, and federal elections across the South in 1875 and 1876 allowed the Democratic Party to win back control of the remaining Republican-led Reconstruction states (Foner 2014).

<sup>12</sup>See Abbott (1986) and Heersink and Jenkins (2020) for detailed studies on the strategies of Republicans in trying to build a competitive southern wing.

<sup>13</sup>Of the more than twenty Republicans elected as governor in the Reconstruction states between 1868 and 1890, none were African American. Furthermore, only 2 of the 29 Republicans elected to the US Senate during this period were African American.

Americans were elected to public office in this period (see e.g., Foner 1993), there exists no comprehensive directory of politicians by partisan affiliation or race. The state conventions that were mandated by the 1867 Military Reconstruction Acts, however, do provide a snapshot of the politicians that comprised the Southern Republican Party. Using roll calls from these conventions, Hume and Gough (2008) classify each delegate by their partisan affiliation. Of those delegates classified as a Republican, approximately a third were African American.<sup>14</sup> Of the remaining Republican delegates, 40% were Southern whites, who were derisively known as “*scalawags*,” and 25% were Northerners and known as “*carpetbaggers*.”

Historians have documented that division within southern Republicans coincided with racial and wealth differences. *Scalawags* for instance, were often wealthy former Whigs (including former planters) who opportunistically joined the party and pushed a platform of economic development, especially state support for railroad construction. *Carpetbaggers* settled in the South following the war (often Union soldiers) and tended to support greater social equality. While these two groups often battled for the leadership of the Southern wing of the party,<sup>15</sup> the main emphasis of both groups was to promote policies promoting economic development. African-American politicians, on other hand, were more interested in redistributive policies, in particular, in raising tax revenues to fund public education and land redistribution (Foner, 2014; Hahn, 2003; Logan, 2020). Thus, black representation was critical for the promotion of policies preferred by black voters. A key question is what determined whether a black politician was elected, especially in districts in which blacks formed a high proportion of the voters.

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<sup>14</sup>There was enormous variation across conventions. African Americans were a majority in Louisiana and South Carolina and comprised more than 25% of delegates in all conventions (Hume and Gough 2008).

<sup>15</sup>A quintessential example of this battle for the control of party is the was the bitter conflict in Mississippi between James Alcorn, a Whig planter who owned nearly 100 slaves in 1860 but opposed secession, and Ames Adelbert, a Union general from Maine who was assigned as a military governor of Mississippi during Reconstruction.

### 3 Effect of Enforcement on Representation

In this section, we empirically explore the relationship between the presence of federal troops and the incidence of black representatives at the various stages of Reconstruction. We begin the analysis examining the initial success of black and white Republican delegates in the various state constitutional conventions mandated in the Reconstruction acts. We then study this association using a panel of black representatives in each state legislature between 1868 and 1880. Our econometric results suggest that troops were a key determinant for the electoral success of these politicians.

#### 3.1 Data

We use multiple sources listing the personal characteristics of state convention delegates and state legislators to construct an original measure of black representation at the local level during the period. Our first source is Hume and Gough (2008) which presents detailed biographical information on each of the delegates elected to the Reconstruction conventions between November 1867 and June 1868.<sup>16</sup> The electorate of these conventions was composed mainly of newly enfranchised former slaves and native southern whites. According to the census records, approximately 23% of the delegates participating in these assemblies were black (223 out of 973). The convention in South Carolina reports having the highest share of black delegates (58%) while Texas had the fewest (9%). Their data also shows that the vast majority of black delegates were literate and nearly half were free before the War.

For lower house representatives to the state legislatures, our primary source of biographical information is Foner (1993) who lists more than 1500 African Americans elected to federal, state, and local offices in the Reconstruction states from 1868 until each returned to Democratic rule. Unfortunately Foner's directory is both temporally limited and incom-

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<sup>16</sup>The first of these conventions took place in Alabama between November 5 and December 6, 1867. Voters in Texas elected the last in June 1, 1868 and lasted until February 6, 1869 (Hume and Gough (2008, p. 3).

plete. For one, Foner ends his collection for each state in the year in which Democrats regain control from Republicans (i.e., “Redemption”). Setting this limitation aside, his list is still incomplete for the period prior to Redemption.<sup>17</sup> Thus, we extended this dataset with state-specific sources for Alabama (Bailey 2010), Arkansas (Wintory 2006), Florida (Brown 1998), Louisiana (Perkins 1929; Vincent 2011), Mississippi (Satcher 1976), North Carolina (Justesen 2009; Logan 1984; Balanoff 1972), South Carolina (Bryant 1974; Hine 1983), Texas (Brewer 1935), and Virginia (Jackson 1945). This increases the sample of black state legislators in these states from 1021 to 1902. To the best of our knowledge, these lists have never been collected and systematized before.

Our main measure is a count variable reflecting the number of African American representatives in each state’s lower chamber between 1868 and 1880. The trends in this variable across legislative cycles between 1868 and 1878 are shown in Figure 1. This variable is a precise measure of local political representation and is easily comparable across states. State lower houses were also regularly apportioned to each county as a whole number, as opposed to state upper chambers which were composed of multi-county districts.<sup>18</sup> In addition, house representatives were elected with regularity (every two years) and exercised considerable influence over state budgets. In particular, federal governance was very limited and states managed their own social services and fiscal systems.<sup>19</sup>

Our main explanatory variable is based on the U.S. Army occupation information collected and systematized by Downs (2015). This work is the first comprehensive source of military deployments during the period and represents a significant improvement over previous studies. It includes troop counts, unit type, and geographical coordinates for each federal

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
<sup>17</sup>For example, Foner (1993) lists 45 unique state House of Representative seats held by African Americans in Florida, Brown (1998) counts an additional 135 with 28 held before 1876, the year of redemption in this state.

<sup>18</sup>The exceptions are Arkansas, Texas and Virginia. In these cases, we split representative counts over the respective counties weighting by total county population.

<sup>19</sup>For example, according to the 1870 Census, state governments in the South collected around 60% of total state and local (county and municipal) tax revenues while Northern state governments collected less than 25%. These revenues funded 60% of total public education spending in the South (Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1874).

Figure 1

Trends in African American Representation, by electoral cycle



garrison in the Reconstruction states between 1865-1880. These geographic coordinates were matched with contemporaneous county boundaries by the year and month in which troops were deployed.<sup>20</sup> We aggregate monthly deployments to the county-year level by taking the median deployment level for each year.

The occupation dataset shows that although there were a hundred thousand troops throughout the South in 1865, this number quickly dropped to twenty thousand in the next five years. Thus, the military effort declined quickly after the end of the war.<sup>21</sup> In 1871, federal soldiers were stationed in the South in around 200 posts (eight thousand troops total), 160 posts in 1872, 42 posts in 1874 and 71 posts in 1876 (Blair 2005). In Figure 2 we show the trends in the location of Army outposts over the same electoral cycles used in Figure 1.

In the context of insurgency and civil wars, scholars have noted that military interventions are more likely to focus on high resistance areas with high levels of political violence. Areas conducive to resistance typically lack state capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003), are rural and/or rugged (Duffy Toft 2002; Kalyvas 2006) and suffer from ethnic cleavages (Posen 1993; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). As such, these factors are likely to partially explain the location of troops and if they are correlated with black mobilization could be a source of bias. We use a number of time-varying measures in our panel models to control for these factors. First, to control for county size and urbanization we include the total county (log) population and population density (available from the Census and linearly interpolated). We also include a Gini coefficient of land inequality (the frequency of land holdings per county is available in the census) as a measure of the *de-facto* power of elites. We also control for each county's black-population share, as the geographical concentration of African Americans could account for both the incidence of troop deployments and political outcomes. This


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<sup>20</sup>The historical county boundaries available from [http://publications.newberry.org/ahcbp/downloads/united\\_states.html](http://publications.newberry.org/ahcbp/downloads/united_states.html) at the 0.0001 degree tolerance level.

<sup>21</sup>For example, no state, except Texas, ever had more than 10 posts in any given year between 1869-1876 (Gillette 1982). The records collected by Downs (2015) indicate that in 1866 the average Confederate state had troops located in only 17 different counties.

Figure 2

Trends in Troop Deployments, by electoral cycle



variable is available from the 1860, 1870 and 1880 Censuses (values are linearly interpolated between census years). Table 5, Appendix A, presents the descriptive statistics of these control measures.

### 3.2 The Constitutional Conventions of Reconstruction

We begin our analysis using the delegates to each state’s Reconstruction (constitutional) convention (held between late 1867 and early 1869). Our dependent variable is the number of black delegates elected from each county to these conventions. We code all delegates identified by Hume and Gough (2008) as having either a black or a mixed racial heritage as black. In these models we control for a set of economic and geographic factors which could influence both the selection into being a delegate and the level of black mobilization. Our baseline controls are black share (black population over total population), total county population and population density, all from the 1860 Census. As additional controls, we include per capita wealth, per capita farm value, and two geographical characteristics (elevation and distance to the state capital). As shown in Panel a of Table 1, counties occupied in 1867 were significantly wealthier, had higher black share, greater population, and had lower altitude compared to non-occupied counties. Each of these accords with the military posts being more likely in the former high slave-share districts of these states.

Columns 1-3 of Table 2 report the estimates from a simple linear model in which we take the number of black delegates in the 1867-68 conventions as a function of an occupation dummy in 1867.<sup>22</sup> All the standard errors reported are robust to heteroskedasticity. In a simple bivariate model (column 1), the occupation has a positive and highly significant correlation with the number of black representatives. The point estimate of 0.49 (S.E.=0.1) indicates that a county occupied in 1867 was associated with approximately 0.5 more black delegates compared to a non-occupied county. This account for almost 70% of the standard deviation observed in the number of black delegates to these conventions. Table 2

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<sup>22</sup>The results are analogous if instead we transform this count measure of delegates into a dummy indicator and estimate a linear probability model.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics

	Non-Occupied		Occupied		Difference
	Mean (1)	St. Dev. (2)	Mean (3)	St. Dev. (4)	t (5)
(a) Full Sample					
Black share	0.397	0.010	0.442	0.018	-2.192
Total Population	11058.130	302.694	13885.290	855.401	-3.872
Population Density	20.182	0.544	20.121	2.169	0.039
Per capita Farm Values	198.403	6.285	204.532	13.322	-0.443
Per capita Wealth	661.967	13.317	839.324	30.798	-5.893
ln Mean elevation	4.642	0.056	4.273	0.107	3.074
ln Distance to state capital	11.829	0.031	11.684	0.097	1.882
Counties	428		119		
(b) Restricted Sample					
Black share	0.467	0.013	0.505	0.017	-1.713
Total Population	13337.580	451.698	15740.770	948.164	-2.598
Population Density	24.057	0.604	25.896	2.322	-1.003
Per capita Farm Values	205.422	7.435	214.455	12.262	-0.660
Per capita Wealth	740.336	18.375	829.551	26.823	-2.760
ln Mean elevation	4.661	0.071	4.295	0.126	2.719
ln Distance to state capital	11.645	0.047	11.526	0.102	1.215
Counties	204		100		

also presents these models with our baseline controls (column 2) and full set of additional controls (column 3). While the point estimate in these models decreases, both remain highly significant.

In models 4 to 6 we take as the dependent variable the total number of delegates in these conventions identified with the Republican Party. This include delegates with black or mixed racial heritage plus Northern whites (“carpetbaggers”).<sup>23</sup> The point estimate in these models is larger and highly significant. In the model with the full set of controls (column 6), the average occupied county is associated with almost 0.7 more Republicans compared to the average non-occupied county (point estimate of 0.68, S.E.=0.12).

Table 2 Local Black Officeholders

	Black Delegates			Republican Delegates		
	State Conventions 1867-68			State Conventions 1867-68		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1{Occupation 1867}	0.490	0.390	0.414	0.833	0.685	0.688
	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.138)	(0.112)	(0.120)
Counties	549	546	541	549	546	541
R-squared	0.080	0.265	0.279	0.119	0.336	0.351
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1{Zone of Influence 1867}	0.500	0.405	0.410	0.811	0.674	0.641
	(0.120)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.158)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Counties	306	306	304	306	306	304
R-squared	0.075	0.260	0.293	0.110	0.326	0.354
Baseline Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

In the bottom panel of Table 2, we then explore the robustness of the results by using the pre-war railway network to construct a sample of non-occupied counties sharing a key observable with occupied counties. Namely, the presence of a railway line was crucial given the logistical difficulties the Army had in provisioning troops (Downs 2015). The use of

<sup>23</sup>This Northern whites represented approximately 44% of all the Republican representatives (174 out of 397).

cavalry regiments was very limited (these were quickly dismantled after 1865), and as a result the occupation relied almost exclusively on infantry (Bradley 2015). Hence, the use of rail transport was crucial for the ability of troops to mobilize in different areas.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, according to our data, counties within 10 kilometers of a railway line were 56% more likely to be occupied in 1867 compared to other counties.

We use this importance of railways to find counties which presumably have the same likelihood of being occupied (given the availability of rail transport). Namely, we characterize a set of areas in which the Army had more capacity to exert power given their proximity to a railway line. We call these areas “zones of influence” and define them as counties having a railway line within 5 kilometers of an Army site. We then restrict the estimating sample by comparing these areas with counties having a railway line but not an Army site in close proximity (see Appendix A, Figure 5 for a map of these areas and the comparison counties). In columns 7-12 we present the results using this restricted sample. As seen, the point estimates are remarkably similar to the ones we obtained using the full sample.

Lastly, in Table 3, we vary the distance to an Army railway line to explore the sensitivity of the 5 kilometer threshold for proximity of military influence to our estimates. We expect such influence on the number of black representatives to diminish as the distance to a railway line controlled by the Army increases. Hence, we vary the distance from 10 kilometers to 20 and 30, which increases the number of counties under military influence. As expected, the zones of influence dummy approximates a local effect which declines as the distance to an army line increases. This is true for both the models taking the set of black representatives (columns 1-3) and the set of all Republican delegates (columns 4-6).

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<sup>24</sup>Downs and Nesbit (2015) estimate that infantry troops could march up to fifteen miles per day, while the cavalry would ride for thirty (at an average speed of five miles per hour) For example, an officer stationed in South Carolina reported that his troops “show a very credible efficiency but they frequently have to march long distances to quell disturbances...A small force of cavalry would be of infinite service”.

Table 3 Local Black Officeholders

	Black Delegates			Republican Delegates		
	State Conventions <10km	State Conventions <20km	State Conventions <30km	State Conventions <10km	State Conventions <20km	State Conventions <30km
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1{Zone of Influence 1867}	0.410 (0.103)	0.192 (0.073)	0.128 (0.061)	0.641 (0.130)	0.296 (0.091)	0.196 (0.079)
Counties	304	358	396	304	358	396
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

### 3.3 State Legislatures 1868-80

We now explore the impact of troops on the dynamics of representation using a panel of black representatives in each state’s lower house from 1868 to 1880. Assessing the effect of the military occupation on political representation is difficult for a number of reasons. First, as highlighted above, scholars have found that occupation or devolution decisions are likely endogenous to factors such as pre-existing political organization (Gerring et al. 2011) or prior resistance (Licklider 1995; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001). Moreover, in the context of Reconstruction, the actors involved in suppressing African American voting may have predicted decreases in local troop commitments and lowered activity to shore up resources or create dominance elsewhere.

We rely on a difference-in-differences approach to control for time-invariant factors that may account for a county’s occupation status. We also condition on time-varying observables that may have affected local occupation including population density, total population, Black share, foreign share and land inequality. As deployment decisions were heavily influenced by district commanders, we include nonlinear district-specific time trends.

Table 4 presents two-way fixed effects estimates where the independent variables are contemporaneous occupation variables - a binary indicator, the (logged) number of military

units and the (logged) number of military troops. In Columns (1)-(3), we find support for the claim that occupied counties experienced significantly greater minority representation in state legislatures between 1868-1880. Occupied counties elected 0.12 more black state legislators, or 34.5% of the average minority representation at the time, a substantively large effect.

We also find that replacing the occupation dummy with specific measures of the number of military units and the number of troops, respectively, had a similarly large substantive effect. Namely, an increase in the number of military units by 1% was associated with an increase in representation by 11%; and a 1% increase in the number of troops corresponded to a 3-4% increase. Columns (2)-(3),(5)-(6) and (8)-(9) further controls for black share, population density, total population and land Gini. The direction and magnitude of the effects is robust to controlling for each of these factors as well as district-period fixed effects.

To assess the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption, Figure 3 presents event study estimates for each occupation measure. We include a full set of relative time indicators, omitting the relative time indicator for the period before treatment (which is  $t - 1$ , the election year before the start of the legislative term). There is not much evidence from the pre-occupation period that the parallel trends assumption is violated, regardless of how occupation is measured. In the post-occupation period, we find that the effects of occupation on legislative representation are short-lived. Compared to the effect of occupation during the election year, counties that are occupied at the start of the legislative period are no more likely to elect African American representatives. From that period forward, effects oscillate, further suggesting short-lived effects that depend upon whether occupied counties have recently or are currently holding elections.


Finally, we present an IV strategy based on the observation that total federal troop deployments fell during Reconstruction, due to competing fiscal pressures, contentious Congressional appropriations procedures and military needs outside of the South. As detailed in the Appendix B, we leverage the national decline in troop deployments as a source of poten-

Table 4 *Military Occupation and Black Representation*

	<i>Dpt. Variable: Black State Legislators</i>								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Occupation Indicator $t-1$	0.116 (0.067)	0.160 (0.070)	0.132 (0.071)						
(ln) Military Units $t-1$				0.110 (0.040)	0.133 (0.042)	0.118 (0.040)			
(ln) Mean Troops $t-1$							0.035 (0.016)	0.044 (0.017)	0.037 (0.017)
$R^2$	0.650	0.656	0.671	0.652	0.657	0.673	0.651	0.656	0.672
Counties	634	634	634	634	634	634	634	634	634
N	4274	4148	4148	4274	4148	4148	4274	4148	4148
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
District $\times$ Period FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: Controls include contemporaneous black population share, foreign-born share, (ln) total population, population density and land Gini. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-level reported in parentheses.

Figure 3 *Effect of Contemporaneous Occupation: Event Study Estimates*



tially exogenous variation in local deployments. Specifically, county-level troop deployments are instrumented with an interaction between total deployments in the rest of the US (outside of the state or district in which the county is located) and a cross-sectional measure of propensity for occupation (early occupation in 1865).

Appendix Table 7 reports two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using the contemporaneous occupation variables. We specify multiple versions of the out-of-state instrument to limit the extent of spill-overs that would violate the exclusion restriction (i.e., the potential that deployments in nearby counties would directly affect representation). Columns (1)-(2) includes the annual count of all troops outside of the state; Column (3)-(4) include just troops in the other 4 military districts. Even-numbered columns further condition on standard controls. Across specifications, the 2SLS estimates further indicate a strong relationship between troop deployments and African American representation. An increase in troop deployments by one percent was associated with a 0.8 increase in the number of black representatives.

## 4 Channels of Representation

Our evidence thus far demonstrates that the presence of federal troops increased the incidence of black representation in the various state legislatures during Reconstruction. This finding contributes to an existing literature studying the specific factors influencing black political participation during this period, such as the the presence of a freedman’s bureau office (Rogowski, 2018), the effects of prewar *free* black population (Logan, 2020) and black social networks (Chay and Munshi, 2012), as well as other well known factors such as political competition.

In this section, we explore how the presence of troops interacts with these other factors. We find that these mechanisms, which have been theorized to facilitate collective action and political mobilization, are more pronounced in occupied counties. We interpret these findings as a ”reality check” on our theoretical argument; namely that the security provided by the Army facilitated the various mechanisms allowing black voters and their representatives to participate and be electorally successful.

### 4.1 Social Networks

Since at least Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1994), scholars have argued that strong horizontal social capital may be essential for promoting good governance. Voting and, in particular, running for office are costly and sometimes fatal for ethnic minorities. Therefore, areas that are able to reduce the costs of political action through social connectedness may enjoy more representation.

Social capital was deeply entrenched amongst former slaves, albeit informally. Historians have long noted particular socio-cultural conditions in intermediate and large plantations. In contrast with small farms, where masters and slaves often worked and ate alongside each other, large plantations were based on a highly regimented and hierarchical system in which slaves lived in close-knit slave quarters and practiced highly-specialized work (Stampp

1966).<sup>25</sup> The occupational hierarchy induced by their masters and the self-autonomy within the slave quarter created opportunities for internal social hierarchies and leadership. The churches formed within the quarters of large farms are also believed to have contributed to solidarity and cooperation among slaves. And although slaves in large plantations were significantly more productive than free laborers or slaves on small farms (Fogel 1994), large plantations alternated between periods of intense productivity and periods of lower productivity and resistance (Genovese 1976).<sup>26</sup>

We explore these opposing views of how social capital among former slaves may have interacted with the federal enforcement. Specifically, following Chay and Munshi (2012), we use the median number of county slave-holding size, as a proxy for the density of black social networks.

## 4.2 Supply of Black Politicians

Logan (2020) theorized that the supply of potential black politicians reflected in part the presence of a pool of qualified candidates (e.g., literate, politically informed). He uses the variation in a county’s population of free blacks in 1860 as proxy for candidate supply. Although small (they were just 2% of the 1860 Southern population), many free blacks were educated, owned property, and maintained businesses (especially in comparison to the enslaved). Furthermore, they tended to be spatially concentrated.

## 4.3 Freedmen’s Bureau

Another factor that may have influenced the electoral success of blacks was the presence of the other primary federal bureaucracy operating in the South on behalf of the formerly enslaved: the Freedman’s Bureau. Congress created the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and

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<sup>25</sup>Gang laborers on large farms accounted for 50% of the adult slave population in 1860

<sup>26</sup>A competing view is that at least in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the former slaves found themselves in a situation “designed to destroy social capital among slaves and between slaves and freemen” (Putnam 2001). In this view, as slavery reduced social capital, social capital amongst blacks should have a negative or small correlation with the observed patterns of black representation.

Abandoned Land (Freedmen’s Bureau) in early 1865 for the purpose of providing social and legal services to former slaves and black veterans. Although the Bureau had important achievements, particularly in building schools and universities across the South, it was largely understaffed and constantly resisted by white Southerners. Bureau agents were often targeted by white supremacists who viewed them as too sympathetic with black empowerment. Given this hostility the military commanders were also responsible for supporting the Bureau’s operations and protecting their agents. Since education and health are potentially complementary to black social capital and the supply of potential officeholders, we expect the Bureau to have a positive and significant effect on black mobilization and representation, especially in the occupied counties.

#### 4.4 Initial Mobilization & Political Competition

We also test two additional factors that may have affected the electoral success of black candidates. First, we test the effects of *initial mobilization* or early success by using the number of black delegates in these conventions as a direct measure of the “initial” mobilization capacity and effectiveness of black politicians. While the *de jure* franchise did not vary over time or between counties during Reconstruction, this capacity was surely undermined by the targeted violence during the period. If troops effectively raised the cost of violence and made repression less likely, we expect that patterns of early black representation to be more persistent in occupied counties. However, if troop deployments do not help maintain early gains in minority representation, this would suggest that the effect of the occupation on representation operates through channels different from early mobilization.

Second, we explore whether political competition amplifies the effect of federal troops on black representation. A strong incumbency advantage has been linked to both ethnic and gender under-representation (Darcy 1994; Palmer and Simon 2010). This is because the level of political competition in single-member districts lowers legislators’ perceived chances of winning (Maestas et al. 2006) or because it reduces voters’ appetite for politically inexpe-

rienced candidates. To capture this mechanism, we use the Democratic vote share in 1860 presidential elections as a proxy for prewar electoral competitiveness. We expect competition to interact positively with troops in explaining black representation (e.g., black politicians in occupied counties won competitive districts more easily).

## 4.5 Results

Figure 4 plots coefficient estimates from cross-sectional regressions including standard covariates and state fixed effects. The independent variable in each figure is an indicator for county occupation by federal troops. Each vertical line represents a cross-sectional regression limited to that year.

First, sub-figure (a) indicates that troops had the most significant impact in areas with any Freedman’s Bureau Office presence between 1868-1870. Contemporaneously unoccupied counties with any Freedman’s Bureau Office presence elected 45% more African American state legislators than the average county. In contrast, occupied counties with any Freedman’s Bureau Office presence elected 120% more African American state legislator than the average. The difference is both statistically significant and persists even as the number of troops falls in 1874/76.

Sub-figures (b)-(c) provide strong evidence in support of the claim that that federal troops activated preexisting black mobilization. From 1870-1874, areas with a higher density of early social ties between enslaved blacks (median farm slave-holding) elected significantly more state legislators when occupied. The figures also suggest preexisting human capital in the form of free black population in 1860 increased minority representation but only in occupied counties (at the 10% confidence level).

Next, sub-figure (d) suggests that county variation in political competition (as measured by county Democratic vote share in 1860) cannot account for the relationship between occupation and representation. Unreported regressions suggest that this pattern is not particular to Presidential elections - gubernatorial and Congressional election vote share as well as other

measures of political competition fail to account for this relationship. While estimated more precisely for non-occupied counties, neither group likely experienced heightened minority representation as a result of higher pre-Reconstruction levels of political competition.

Finally, sub-figure (e) highlights that federal troops were significantly able to extend gains in early representation in the short-run (two years). Though representation by minority delegates in 1868 continued to strongly predict minority representation until 1876, occupied counties were statistically no different from non-occupied counties by 1872.


## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we have empirically explored whether federal military interventions affect the incidence of minority representation following the wide-scale expansion of the franchise. We use the imposed enfranchisement of the former slaves following the South's defeat in the US Civil War. The brief period in which the federal government used the Army to enforce the political rights of African Americans saw the election of thousands of African Americans across the South, the rise of the Southern wing of the Republican Party, and a huge expansion in the role of the Southern state (especially in public education).


The evidence shows that when protected by federal forces, Southern counties elected 20% more African American state legislators. This evidence fits with a growing literature on the importance of *de facto* institutions to complement changes in *de jure* landscape (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). It also speaks to the consequences of current efforts to restrict minority voting and the failure of the federal government to protect their political rights.

Figure 4 Mechanisms


(a) Freedman's Bureau Office (1868-1870)




(b) Median Slave Holding (1860)




(c) Free Black Share (1860)



(d) Political Competition (1860)



(e) Early Minority Representation (1868)



**Note:** Each dot represents the coefficient estimate from a cross-sectional regression with a full-set of county covariates and state fixed effects. 90 and 95% confidence intervals in black.


# Appendix

## Appendix A Summary Statistics and Maps

Table 5 Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>1868-1869</b>					
Black Legislators	640	0.486	1.103	0.000	13.000
Occupation Indicator	634	0.177	0.382	0.000	1.000
Military Units	634	1.268	3.567	0.000	24.000
Troops	634	21.644	72.642	0.000	643.000
<b>1870-1871</b>					
Black Legislators	637	0.446	1.200	0.000	16.000
Occupation Indicator	634	0.065	0.246	0.000	1.000
Military Units	634	0.628	2.896	0.000	24.000
Troops	634	7.625	38.137	0.000	501.250
<b>1872-1873</b>					
Black Legislators	641	0.493	1.187	0.000	13.000
Occupation Indicator	634	0.054	0.225	0.000	1.000
Military Units	634	0.631	2.932	0.000	24.000
Troops	634	7.172	38.635	0.000	436.250
<b>1874-1875</b>					
Black Legislators	636	0.327	1.024	0.000	14.000
Occupation Indicator	634	0.062	0.240	0.000	1.000
Military Units	634	0.528	2.393	0.000	20.000
Troops	634	8.231	48.453	0.000	679.500
<b>1876-1877</b>					
Black Legislators	639	0.183	0.736	0.000	12.000
Occupation Indicator	634	0.066	0.249	0.000	1.000
Military Units	634	0.636	2.756	0.000	24.000
Troops	634	6.993	38.296	0.000	467.000
<b>Mechanisms</b>					
Black Convention Delegates (1867/68)	511	0.415	0.903	0.000	10.000
Free Black Share (1860)	490	3.913	6.864	0.000	50.518
Freedman's Bureau Office (1860-1870)	640	0.548	0.726	0.000	10.000
Median Slave-holding (1860)	592	16.426	14.045	0.000	109.000
<b>Controls (1868-1869)</b>					
(log) Total Population	640	9.105	0.724	4.276	12.144
(log) Population Density	639	2.842	0.869	-1.883	7.189
Black Share	640	0.398	0.211	0.002	0.924
Foreign Share	514	0.011	0.035	0.000	0.494
Land Gini	640	0.455	0.075	0.000	0.643

Figure 5 Zone of Military Influence and Comparison Counties, 1867



Blue dots represent a military outpost in 1867. Dark gray counties are "treated" counties, having a railway line and a military outpost within close proximity (less than 5 km). Light gray counties are the comparison counties, namely counties having a railway line but not a military outpost in close proximity.

## Appendix B Instrumental Variables Analysis

Our secondary identification strategy for the panel is an instrumental variable analysis of the following form:

$$y_{cst} = \beta_2 Troops_{cst} + \mathbf{X}_{cst}\gamma_2 + \alpha_{cs} + \alpha_{st} + \mu_{cst}, \quad (1)$$

$$Troops_{cst} = (Occupied_{cs1865} \times \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq s} Troops_{cjt})\beta_1 + \mathbf{X}_{cst}\gamma_1 + \delta_{cs} + \delta_{st} + \varepsilon_{cst} \quad (2)$$

where  $Occupied_{cs1865}$  is an indicator for the presence of any troops immediately after the cessation of the war in 1865;  $D_{cs1865} \times \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq s} Troops_{cjt}$  is the mean out-of-state troop deployments (interacted with an indicator for counties in which troops existed in 1865); and the other variables are defined as above. The test of interest is  $\beta_2 = 0$  i.e., for early occupation counties an increase in troop deployments increased African American representation.

The intuition behind this strategy is similar to a *difference-in-difference estimator*. The first stage estimates compare troop counts for counties that are more likely to experience troop deployments (because they had troops in 1865) to counties that were less likely to experience troop deployments, in years following high national deployment levels relative to years following lower national deployment levels. Similarly, the second stage compares the difference in political outcomes in counties that were likely to have troop deployments (i.e., as measured by 1865 deployments) to counties that were unlikely to have troop deployments in years following high national deployment levels relative to years following low national deployment levels. Importantly, the local average treatment effect (LATE) represents the average effect for compliers only i.e., counties that receive more troops following national level increases in troop deployments. This represents a different effect than the OLS estimates in Table 4, because the effect for counties for which county troop counts are unresponsive to national level troop shocks are netted out in Equation 1.

## Appendix B.1 Assumptions

Next, we discuss the conditions under which the LATE (i.e. the average treatment effect of deployment among compliers) has a causal interpretation. In particular, we discuss causal independence, the exclusion restriction, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), a non-zero effect on outcomes and monotonicity (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996).

**Causal independence:** The instrumental variable strategy leverages the fact that out-of-state troop deployments were not driven by local demand for troops. Instead, shocks to troop counts were driven by national factors such as the election of President Ulysses S. Grant in 1868 and the Panic of 1873 as well as stochastic changes in troop deployments driven by local conditions in other military districts.

For one, the number of federal troops was determined by Congressional appropriations bills. These fluctuated with intense debates in Washington about the relative merits of occupation on the one hand and the financial costs/ democratic risks of occupation on the other. Federal support followed the tide of financial shocks and the need to repay heavy civil war debt. For example, the Panic of 1873 raised concerns about the economy’s stability which lead investors to shy away from US bonds. Figure 2 shows the fluctuations in total troop deployments across time; an examination of troop deployments by district indicates even greater district-specific variance.

**Exclusion Restriction:** Out-of-state troop deployments arguably satisfy the exclusion restriction as any national factors simultaneously affecting non-state troop counts and local outcomes for African Americans would be removed by the inclusion of time-fixed effects. As a robustness test, we address potential threats to the exclusion restriction induced by counties bordering other states by constructing an out-of-district count that removes adjacent states in the same district.

Relatedly, SUTVA would be violated if the incidence of troop commitments of any county affected another county’s political outcomes. If, as we have argued, spatial proximity to troop deployments predicted better outcomes for African Americans in the Reconstruction

South, it is possible that these effects may not have respected county borders. However, the likelihood of spillover effects is low because most troops were infantry who could cover 10-15 miles per day in counties that were often 400 square miles or more.

Furthermore, we find no evidence of spillovers in a simple empirical test (Table 6). For non-occupied counties, we compare representation outcomes for counties for which any adjacent neighbor was contemporaneously occupied against counties whose neighbors were not occupied. Columns (1)-(3) provide little evidence that the occupation of neighboring counties systematically impacted African American representation, whether we condition on covariates or restrict our analysis to a more comparable subset of counties with railway lines in 1860. Next, we compare the sum of all minority legislators for counties that were occupied against counties that were not occupied. In Columns (4-6), we similarly find that a binary measure of occupation has no correlation with contemporaneous African American representation in neighboring counties.

Table 6 Occupation & Political Representation (Spatial Effects)

	<i>African American Legislators</i>			<i>Sum of African American Legislators (Adj. Counties)</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Adjacent Occupation Indicators	0.026 (0.055)	0.052 (0.064)	0.113 (0.122)			
Occupation Indicators				0.048 (0.070)	0.008 (0.065)	0.024 (0.087)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District $\times$ Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Railways 1860 Sample			Yes			Yes
Standard Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	3980	3873	1531	4274	4148	1734
Counties	634	634	264	634	634	264

Columns (2),(3),(5),(6) include contemporaneous black share, (log) total population, population density and land Gini. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-level in parentheses. \* significant at the  $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$

We assume that the monotonicity assumption holds as it is unlikely that any county

would have experienced less troop deployments with an increase in national federal troops (no defiers).

To review, the familiar difference-in-differences assumption would be violated if (a) changes in the national deployment trend lead to different deployment levels in counties occupied in 1865 relative to non-occupied areas in 1865 and (b) these changes also lead to different levels of minority representation in occupied areas as compared to non-occupied areas.<sup>27</sup>

Figure 6 suggests that this is not likely the case. First, sub-figure (a) plots the deployment trend, which reveals two contracted declining periods. Next, sub-figure (b) plots the change in deployments for counties that were occupied in 1865 vis-à-vis counties that were not occupied. The changes are further standardized to emphasize temporal variation. Graphically, these changes are highly correlated with one another and neither group diverge significantly from the national trend. That is, there is little graphical evidence of a correlation between national deployment shocks and a divergence in deployment growth rates between early occupation and non-early occupation counties. Most importantly, sub-figure (c) provides evidence that even if there were significant differences in deployment levels between early occupation and non-early occupation sites, there is little relationship between the national trend and variation in minority representation between these groups - the levels of representation vary similarly in time across these counties.


## Appendix B.2 Results

Table 7 presents results leveraging this IV-2SLS strategy. We specify multiple versions of the out-of-state instrument to limit the extent of spill-overs that would violate the exclusion restriction (i.e., the potential that deployments in nearby counties would directly effect representation). Columns (1)-(2) include the annual count of troops outside of the state; Columns

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<sup>27</sup>However, it is important to note a key difference with other closely related papers exploiting a similar strategy. As the cross-sectional occupation propensity is orthogonal to later *changes* in local politics when controlling for county-fixed effects, there can be no spurious correlation with the outcome measures (?).

Figure 6 Parallel Trends Assumption



(3)-(4) includes just troops in the other 4 military districts. Even-numbered columns further conditions on standard controls.

Across specifications, the 2SLS estimates further indicate a strong relationship between troop deployments and African American representation. Unreported reduced form regressions indicate that out-of-state troop deployments has a strong relationship with African American representation ( $p < 0.001$ ) in the baseline specification. For counties that experienced troop deployments in 1865, an increase in troop deployments by one percent was associated with a 8.8% increase in African American representation. In addition to being strongly significant, the effect represents an increase of 50% of the mean minority representation in any county.

Table 7 Occupation & Political Representation (IV)

	<i>African American State Legislators</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Second Stage</i>			
(log) Troops	0.710 (0.134)	0.818 (0.150)	0.972 (0.174)	1.034 (0.178)
	<i>First Stage</i>			
(log) Non-state Troops × Early Base Indicator <sub>1865</sub>	0.602 (0.091)	0.634 (0.094)		
(log) Non-district Troops × Early Base Indicator <sub>1865</sub>			0.282 (0.043)	0.280 (0.043)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-stat.	43.90	45.29	44.20	42.07
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District × Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Standard Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4274	4148	4274	4148
Counties	634	634	634	634

Even-numbered columns include contemporaneous black share, (log) total population, population density and land Gini. Robust standard errors clustered at the county-level in parentheses.

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