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The Ronald Reagan Centennial

Leadership and Legacy : An Academic Symposium Multiple Locations Reagan Centennial Symposium Papers and Videos February 1-2, 2011 Executive Leadership from the Inside Out Paper from James Pfiffner, George Mason University : Paradox of President Reagan’s Leadership Presidents must lead a large staff of internal advisors, appointees, and high-ranking civil Read more…

When the Smoke Clears

Governance Salon featuring Charles Shipan, University of Michigan In federal systems, governments have the opportunity to learn from the policy experiments (and the potential successes) of other governments. Whether they seize such opportunities, however, may depend on the expertise or past experience of policymakers. Based on an analysis of a Read more…

Lessons of Bell

Governance Reform, Accountability, & Transparency October 4, 2010 Co-Sponsored by SoCal ASPA The LA Times reporters who broke the story about the Bell scandal, a USC expert in administrative ethics, the executive director of the state league of cities and a state legislator who introduced reform legislation will gather for Read more…

America 2050 Forum

Rebuilding and Renewing America – Infrastructure Strategies for the Southwest Megaregion June 19, 2009 The Bedrosian Center on Governance, the Keston Institute for Public Finance and USC, in partnership with America 2050, hosted business, civic, government, and academic leaders on June 19, 2009 at the USC Davidson Conference Center where Read more…

CCG Doctoral Conference

Consortium on Collaborative Governance On April 8-10, 2009 the Consortium on Collaborative Governance held a Doctoral conference at USC’s Ralph and Goldy Lewis Hall. Sixteen doctoral students from across the country gathered to present their research, network and learn from each other as well as established scholars from the three Read more…

PIPE* Workshop: John Matsusaka, USC Marshall School of Business

The Power of Economic Interests Under Direct versus Representative Democracy

The power of economic interest groups to influence policy outcomes is a common theme in economics and political science. Most theories posit that interest group power arises from the ability to influence elected or appointed government officials, that is, by exploiting the representative part of democracy. This paper examines an unstated implication of these theories, that special interest influence will be weaker under direct democracy, when there are no representatives involved.

Bedrosian Center