Jeffery A. Jenkins, Provost Professor of Public Policy, Political Science, and Law, Bedrosian Chair of Governance and the Public Enterprise, Director, Bedrosian Center, and Director, PIPE Collaborative, has been announced…
Tag: PIPE
Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators’ Election Outcomes and Behavior Do audits by executive agencies impact the behavior of those audited? Does revealing negative information about legislators affect electoral results and…
by Nathan K. Micatka On March 14th and 15th 2019, the USC Bedrosian Center’s Political Institutions and Political Economy (PIPE) Collaborative hosted its 2nd Annual Conference. Bringing together scholars from…
by Casey Fischl
Anthony Orlando discussed one of his current research projects, When Citizens Peek Behind the Bureaucratic Veil: An Experiment in Shaping Public Opinion, coauthored by Professor Bill Resh and Ph.D. student, Colin Leslie of the Sol Price School of Public Policy.
by Casey Fischl
Philip Potter discussed his research paper, “Political Violence in China: Terrorism, Official Media, and Political Priorities,” during the January 15, 2019 PIPE Workshop. His research focuses on terrorism and counterterrorism in China, to answer the question of why it is critical that the United States begins to pay more attention to the current state of affairs in China.
by Nathan K. Micatka and Nicholas Napolio On December 4, 2018, a group of scholars gathered at the University of Southern California to present research and perspectives on foreign policy in the age…
by Nathan K. Micatka and Nicholas Napolio On October 30, 2018, several political scientists descended upon the University of Southern California for the Race and Law Enforcement Symposium. The symposium was…
Ben Graham is an assistant professor at USC’s School of International Relations. Ben discussed his paper, Network Ties and the Political Strategies of Firms, co-written with Cesi Cruz. Abstract: Social ties are critical to…
Creativity, Energy, & Experimentation In this episode of the PS You’re Interesting podcast, Jeff Jenkins and Benjamin Newman, Associate Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at the UC Riverside, discuss creativity…
“The study of state and local politics has taken off over the last decade. Data, methods, and research interests have evolved. There are a variety of important questions that can’t…
Congressional primaries, like primary elections in general, are imagined to give voters, rather than party elites, the ability to choose which candidate wins the nomination. Indeed, we might expect primary election outcomes to reflect the preferences of the median primary voter, in roughly the way we expect general election outcomes to reflect the preferences of the overall district median.
We challenge this conventional wisdom.
The Challenge of Measuring Political Polarization in the US over Time using Congressional Roll Call Votes Jeff Lewis is professor of Political Science, UCLA. He is also the current president…
With the goal of fostering cross-disciplinary synergies among political economy scholars and fill the need for a regular meeting place, the USC PIPE Collaborative hosted the First Annual Political Institutions and Political Economy Conference on March 15-16, convening major U.S. scholars from political science, economics, and law to cover important new research on topics such as the unilateral presidency, Congressional committees, city policies, electoral rules, political leadership, and partisanship.
In this episode, Brian Newman uncovers who’s represented, who’s not, and how it affects their view of government.
The Power of Economic Interests Under Direct versus Representative Democracy
The power of economic interest groups to influence policy outcomes is a common theme in economics and political science. Most theories posit that interest group power arises from the ability to influence elected or appointed government officials, that is, by exploiting the representative part of democracy. This paper examines an unstated implication of these theories, that special interest influence will be weaker under direct democracy, when there are no representatives involved.